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THE POWER OF THE STATES TO TAX

INTANGIBLES
HENRY ROTTSCHaAEFER*
There have been but few judges who have shared Mr. Justice
Holmes' doubts' as to the relevance of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the problem of the states' jurisdiction to
tax. The doctrine that it imposes important limitations on the states
in that matter is now too firmly established to encourage any hope
of its abandonment within any reasonable future period. States will
have to continue adapting their tax policies to its requirements however much publicists may inveigh against it as an instance of judicial
usurpation. There has already developed a considerable body of
law defining the specific meaning of the due process clause in relation to this problem as applied to a variety of particular fact situations. Recent decisions of the Supreme.Court of the United States
have, however, raised the question of how far the earlier decisions
may still be accepted by the states as safe guides -by which to steer
their tax courses in dealing with intangible property whether as tax
subject or as tax measure.2 The difficulty confronting the states has
arisen from the frank repudiation by some of those decisions of
principles that had for years passed current as law. The lack of
agreement among the members of the Court as to the reasons for the
reversal of former specific rules adds to the uncertainty of what, if
any, further changes may be expected. Every attempt to plot the
course of future decisions involves predictions whose probable accuracy will depend on the extent to which they are based on the
selection and proper weighing of the factors that will affect those
decisions. No rule or system of rules has yet been discovered for
eliminating uncertainty from our predictions. There are factors
which we have reason to believe will affect the result but of whose
influence and method of operation we know so little that our knowledge constitutes an insecure and unsatisfactory basis for prediction.
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. By arrangement with the
author and the MiNmssoTA LAw R~mrw, this article is published simultaneously in the two law reviews.
'Union Ref. Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36, 50
L. ed. 150 (1905).
'See for discussion of the problem of tax subject and tax measure, Isaacs,
The Subject and Measure of Taxation (1926) 26 Col. L. REv. 939.
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There are others whose operations have been more clearly revealed.
Our knowledge of the extent and method of their contribution to the
result is neither complete nor exact, but merely more adequate than
with respect to other factors. It seems preferable, in the present
state of our knowledge, to base our predictions on this latter type.
The most important of these is the effect upon judicial decisions of
prior judicial decisions and theories. However deficient our knowledge of its influence may be, we still know more about that than
about the effects of judicial social philosophies, and infinitely more
than about the effects of the judges' physical condition when passing
on the case, about which our knowledge is so meager that outside
aid has to be invoked to give plausibility to the theory of its contribution. This does not involve any denial that other factors than past
judicial acting and thinking have a bearing on the problem. It means
only that past judicial decisions, and the reasoning and theories explicit or implicit in judicial opinions, are the materials having the
greatest presently available predictive value even in dealing with a
problem created by decisions involving judicial refusal to treat those
factors as the sole or necessarily most decisive determinants in the
process.
The scope of the changes wrought in the law as to a state's power
to subject intangibles to various kinds of taxes by the series of recent
decisions3 depends on their implications which in turn are closely
tied up with their reasoning. They all involved inheritance taxes
imposed by states other than that of the decedent's domicile. The
sole basis for the tax in the FarmersLoan & Trust Co. and Beidler
Cases was the domicile of the debtor within the taxing state, while
in the Baldwin Case the claim was predicated, as to some of the credits, on the presence for safe-keeping within the state of the securities
representing the credits. 4 The FarmersLoan & Trust Co. Case was
the first to definitely and explicitly break with the law as theretofore
established in Blackstone v. Miller5 which had sustained an inheritance tax by the state of the debtor's domicile on credits of a non'Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minn., 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L.
ed. 371 (1930) ; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L. ed.

1056 (1930); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct.
54 (1930).
These decisions will frequently be referred to in the subsequent discussion
as "the recent decisions" or "the recent cases."
'This statement is not intended to affirm that the arguments used in the
opinions in some of these cases do not suggest other possible bases. These
will be considered in the course of the discussion.
'188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct 277, 47 L. ed. 439 (1903).
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resident with respect to whose transfer the decedent's state had
imposed a like tax. Power over the debtor was held to confer jurisdiction to tax, and the resulting multi-state taxation was held not to
violate either the fourteenth amendment or any other federal constitutional provision. A little more than a decade after Blackstone
v. Miller due process was construed to permit a state to levy an inheritance tax on the transfer of notes owned by a non-resident but
kept within the state for safe-keeping, even when the debtors were
non-residents of the taxing state and no property within it was mortgaged to secure the notes. 6 The principal reason urged in support
of this conclusion was that the convenience and understanding of
business men, which had made of bonds the debt itself, extended to
bills and notes, and that, therefore, the credits could be deemed to
have a situs where their tangible evidences were kept. There was
no doubt but that the state in which credits had a business situs could
impose an inheritance tax on their transfer on that basis alone even
as that factor justified it to tax them by property taxes.7 There
were, therefore, four distinct jurisdictions that had a constitutional
power to subject the transfer of credits and bonds to inheritance
taxes at the time the Court decided the Farmers Loan & Trust Co.
Case. Efforts to reduce this evil by deducing from the due process
clause a prohibition against inheritance taxation by the state of
decedent's domicile when the bonds were permanently kept for
safe-keeping outside it, based on the theory that such bonds were
tangibles within the protection of the principle of Frick v. Pennsylvania,8 were defeated not long before the FarmersLoan & Trust Co.
decision. 9 It was this "startling possibility" which suggested to the
Supreme Court that the law on this matter had developed from an
incorrect premise. It is this new premise that must be sought in the
recent decisions.
The reasoning of the prevailing opinion of Mr. Justice McWheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434, 34 Sup. Ct. 607, 58 L. ed. 1030 (1914).
"New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 110, 44 L. ed. 174
(1899).
'268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69 L. ed. 1058, 42 A. L. R. 316 (1925).
'Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410, 72 L. ed. 749 (1928).
It was the holding in this case that bonds were intangibles that caused the

Supreme Court of Minnesota, which had first held the bonds in the Farmers
Loan & Trust Co. case not taxable because they were tangible [In re Taylor's
Estate, 175 Minn. 310, 219 7N. W. 153 (1928)] to reverse its former holding
[In re Taylor's Estate, 175 Minn. 315, 221 N. W. 64 (1928)] only to have their
former result affirmed by the federal Supreme Court, although on a different
theory.
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Reynolds in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota formulates a
new premise for at least a certain class of cases. It commences with
an unusually explicit over-ruling of Blackstone v. Miller so far as
that decision lent support to the theory that different states could
tax on diverse and inconsistent theories. The case was overruled
because it had produced friction between the states and its practical
effects had been bad. This, however, does not yet give a new
premise. That is found in that part of this opinion in which it holds
that the general reasons inhibiting the taxation of tangible personalty
by more than one state apply "under present circumstances equally
to intangibles." The reasons assigned are that primitive conditions
have passed, that business is now conducted on a national scale, and
that a large part of' the national wealth is invested in negotiable
securities whose protection against discriminatory, unjust and oppressive taxation is a matter of the greatest moment. This is in accord
with its previous statement that the doctrine of Blackstone v. Miller
is no longer tenable because of the ill effects of that decision. In the
end the opinion concludes that it finds no sufficient reason for the
position that intangibles are not entitled to immunity from taxation
at more than one place the same as tangibles. The broadest premise
deducible from this opinion is that due process prohibits multi-state
taxation of intangibles to the same extent that it prevents multi-state
taxation of tangible personalty. The narrowest premise derivable
from it is that due process prevents the state of the debtor's domicile
from subjecting the transfer of bonds to an inheritance tax merely
on that basis. That the premise intended was broader than that last
suggested is clear from the subsequent decisions which have extended
immunity from inheritance taxation predicated on the sole basis of
power over the debtor to bank accounts and ordinary notes, whether
or not secured by property within the taxing state,10 and to ordinary
open accounts.1 ' It should be noted that even power of the taxing
state over the notes did not confer power to impose the tax. How
much broader the premise may be cannot yet be authoritatively determined, but, if its scope is to be defined by reference to the practical
considerations relied on in this opinion, there is no reason for treating it as anything but a prohibition .on all multi-state taxation of
every type of intangible. There is no indication that the discriminatory, unjust and oppressive burden consisted in anything other
" Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct 436, 74 L. ed. 1056 (1930).
' Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54 (1930).
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than the fact of multi-state taxation of the same transfer under modern conditions as to the distribution of capital and its ownership,
which take no account whatever of state lines. That burden is certainly no less in connection with other kinds of intangibles, nor in
respect of other types of taxes than inheritance taxes. If the premise
that was probably in the minds of those of the justices who accepted
this opinion becomes that of the Court, further sweeping changes in
existing law as to a state's jurisdiction to tax are inevitable.
The problem, however, can not be answered merely on the basis of
the premise implicit in the opinion last considered even though the
last of the decisions in this series (which involved the power of the
debtor's state to place an inheritance tax on the transfer of an open
account)' 2 was made without the dissents that marked the two
others. The theories advanced in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in the FarmersLoan & Trust Co. Case and in his dissent
in Baldwin v. Missouri, and in the dissents of Mr. Justice Holmes
in both these cases, must also be considered. It will be convenient
to consider first the dissenting opinions of the latter, concurred in by
Mr. Justice Brandeis. The emphasis in his dissent in the Farmers
Loan & Trust Co. Case was on the fact that the laws of Minnesota
were necessary to the continued existence of the obligation so that its
help was necessary to acquire a right, and that it could demand a quid
pro quo therefor. The affirmative argument in his dissent in Baldwin v. Missouri was predicated on the protection the assets in question received from Missouri, although it also contained a plea not to
hedge the taxing powers of the states with restrictions deduced from
the due process clause, and repeated the theory that that clause does
not permit the Court to interpose to prevent multi-state taxation.
These last considerations would have more force if the doubts as to
the relevance of the due process clause, originally expressed by Mr.
Justice Holmes in the Union Ref. Transit Co. Case,'2 had not been
resolved against his view by a long series of subsequent decisions.
Once that had happened, the issue was no longer as to its relevance,
but became that of the extent of the limitations imposed on the states
by its vague provisions. At this point the plea for a recognition of
the states' interest in a considerable freedom of action in shaping
their tax policies directs attention to a factor that deserves a consideration that it failed to receive in the prevailing opinions. The posiBeidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 282 U. S. 1,51 Sup. Ct. 54 (1930).
"199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36, 50 L. ed. 150 (1905).
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tion, however, that Minnesota should have been allowed to tax
because the obligation owed its origin and continued existence to its
laws seems adequately answered by the theory of Mr. Justice Stone
that, once it had passed out of that state, the laws of Minnesota
neither protected it nor could it withhold the power of transfer or
prescribe its terms, and his further position that the fact that Minnesota law kept the obligation alive constituted too attenuated a legal
relation of that state to the obligation to furnish a reasonable basis
for its taxation of the transfer. 14 The reference by Mr. Justice
Holmes of Missouri's power to tax to the protection it accorded the
securities involved in Baldwin v. Missouri has considerable support
in the authorities. The prevailing opinion in the case last cited ignored this factor, but there is no way for determining whether this
is to be taken as an indication that that factor has become unimportant or means merely that it cannot prevail when another state has a
prior claim to tax.
There remain to be considered the views of Mr. Justice Stone.
He agreed with the results reached in FarmersLoan & Trust Co. v.
Minnesota, but reached it by a quite independent line of reasoning.
Starting from the premise that a state can impose a privilege tax,
such as an inheritance tax, only if the privilege is enjoyed within it,
he held the tax invalid because the transfer of the bonds was effected
in, and controlled by the laws of, the state of the decedent's domicile,
strengthening this position by invoking the principle that it is that
law which, by generally accepted rules, is applied in the transfer and
receives recognition elsewhere. If, however, the facts are such that
an act essential to a completed transfer must occur in another state,
which ordinarily could be compelled only within it and in accordance
with its laws, then such non-domiciliary state can impose its inheritance tax on that transfer. It was for this reason, and also because
a transfer by delivery made in Missouri would have defeated the
transfer made in the state of decedent's domicile, that he dissented in
Baldwin v. Missouri. The fact on which Missouri's powers must
have been deemed predicated was the presence of the bank account,
bonds and notes within it, and their ancillary administration therein,
since this factor alone applied to each of the assets involved in the
case. The earlier decision in Wheeler v. Sohmer is a logical implication of this theory. It is very doubtful that Mr. Justice Stone was
"See opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L. ed. 371 (1930).
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merely expanding the power argument in the form that it took in
Blackstone v. Miller, since he must be deemed to have rejected that
in reaching the result he reached in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.
Minnesota. His view rather seems to be that the payment of a tax
in two places on the same economic interest, with respect to which
the owner has sought and secured the benefit of the laws in both, is
not so oppressive or arbitrary as to violate constitutional limitations.
The substance of this position is that a state has the power to tax an
economic interest to which it has accorded protection if its owner
has sought its protection with respect thereto. This correlation of
the power to tax with benefits conferred has considerable authority
to support it, but there have been decisions denying it even as to an
economic interest voluntarily within the taxing state.1 5 Whether
the mere receipt of benefits would justify a tax is not quite clear in
view of the reference to the factor that the owner had sought the
benefits derived from the laws of the taxing state.16 It may, in any
case, be assumed that the situation in the Baldwin Case constituted
one within the theory expressed by Mr. Justice Stone in his concurring opinion in FarmersLoan & Trust Ca. v. Minnesota that a single
economic interest might have such legal relationships with different
taxing jurisdictions as to justify its taxation in both. There is no
indication that he intends to raise any question as to the domiciliary
state's power. It rather seems that in his view that state has the
power to impose the tax in the case of all intangible personalty. His
theory at this point is probably not intended to suggest a principle
for restricting the domiciliary state's power, but rather to announce
a basis for defining what other states shall also be permitted to tax.
This seems the view most consistent with his clear disapproval of the
theory that multi-state taxation alone and under all circumstances
amounts to a violation of the due process clause expressed in his
opinions.
The preceding analysis of the Baldwin and Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. Cases has shown several members of the Court averse to
15
See, e.g., Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 27 Sup. Ct 712, 51 L. ed. 1106
(1907).
"'The securities of a resident of one state might be in another state in the
possession of a thief resident in the latter on the day of the true owner's

death. The latter state would restore the securities to the proper represent-

atives of the decedent if proper steps were taken. Does the reference to the
factor that the owner sought the protection result in preventing the nondomiciliary state from imposing its inheritance tax under these circumstances?
And would resort to its courts to recover them involve seeking its protection
so as to permit the tax to be imposed?
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treating the ,due process clause as a complete prohibition of multistate taxation of the same legal and economic interest. The single
element common to the views of the several dissenting justices is the
conception that a state that accords to an interest benefits and protection should be permitted to tax it irrespective of the recognized
power of an6ther state to also tax it. The question, therefore, arises
whether the rather lukewarm assent of Messrs. Justices Holmes and
Brandeis to the extension of the principles of these cases by the case
of Beidler v,. South Carolina Tax Commission is to be taken as a
complete acceptance by them of the theory that multi-state taxation
violates due process or merely as a recognition that the prior decisions, even when not thus broadly construed, could not well be denied
application to the credits involved in that case. Further decisions
involving inheritance taxes on other intangibles, or other types of
taxes on the same or other intangibles, alone can give the answer;
but it seems reasonably clear from the tenor of their concurring
opinion that further opposition may be expected to extending the
theory, which the majority of the court seems to have accepted, to
other intangibles and to other types of taxation. Nor is there any
present indication that Mr. Justice Stone has surrendered the position so forcibly and ably presented by him, unless his failure to express himself in the Beidler Case can be construed so to indicate,
which is highly doubtful. The net effect is a condition of uncertainty as to the exact premise that will furnish the approach to future
problems. Even, however, if the complete prohibition of multi-state
taxation be taken as the premise most likely to be adopted, there remains the question of when that will be deemed to be present. There
are many situations in which the same single economic interest is
treated as supporting a series of legally recognized interests therein.
The ultimate economic interest supporting the mortgagor's and mortgagee's legal interest in mortgaged realty is identical to the extent of
the amount of the loan secured by the mortgage. Yet it is practically
certain that the state in which the realty is situated would not be
violating due process by taxing the mortgagor on the whole value of
the mortgaged premises while contemporaneously taxing the credit
secured -bythat mortgage.17 Due process, therefore, does not require
a state to recognize that these different legal interests merely represent a division of shares in a single economic interest, but permits
' This is not decided in, but seems to be a fair inference from, Paddell v.
New York, 211 U. S. 446, 29 Sup. Ct. 139, 53 L. ed. 275 (1908).
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the double counting of values supported by a single economic interest
in the determination of the total taxable wealth within its jurisdiction.' 8 This duplication of taxable wealth through the recognition
of different legal interests in the same ultimate economic value occurs
in an even more exaggerated form whenever the trustee and the
cestui are treated as having separate taxable interests in the same
assets. Due process does not prohibit a state from taxing that one
of those interests within it even when the other is beyond its power
and taxable elsewhere.1 9 Here the duplication frequently involves
doubling the actual economic wealth for tax purposes, a result not
affected by the fact that the different interests are being taxed by
different states. The case of taxing both the corporate assets and
the stockholders' shares evidencing a distributive economic interest
therein, whether by the same or different states, furnishes another
instance of the same kind against which the federal Constitution interposes no barrier. There is nothing in the theory applied in the
recent decisions heretofore discussed that requires, or even suggests,
the conclusion that these forms of multiple taxation of the same ultimate economic interest will be held violative of due process. Those
decisions involved the relation of one owner to a given complex of
economic relations constituting a single economic interest. That
owner may stand in more than one legal relation with respect to that
interest under the laws of different states, but these decisions limit
to one state the power to recognize such relation for tax purposes.
The thing aimed at is the taxation by more than one state of a single
economic interest of a given person. The system of concurrently
existing legal or equitable interests in a single ultimate economic interest may still be recognized by states for tax purposes despite the
resulting multiple taxation of that interest. The thing prohibited is
the localizing of the legal interest representing any given person's
distributive share in such a single economic interest in more than
one state. That is the effect of those decisions even when the prevailing opinions are given their broadest reasonable and probable
interpretation.
The acceptance of the premise that due process prohibits such
"There is a limit to this process derived from the due process clause. It
has been held that a state in which their owneri held warehouse receipts covering goods outside the state could not tax the receipts at the value of the goods
covered by them. Sellinger v. Kentucky, 213 U. S. 200, 29 Sup. Ct. 449, 53
L. ed. 761 (1909).
"See Welch v. Boston, 231 Mass. 155, 109 N. E. 174 (1915); Hunt v.
Perry, 165 Mass. 287, 43 N. E. 103 (1896).
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multi-state taxation cannot by itself settle the issue as to which state
shall be permitted to impose the tax. That matter has thus far received but little attention. The decisions in all the cases under consideration have preferred the claims of the state of the decedent's
domicile. The preference rests on the basis that prior decisions had
determined that "in general intangibles may be properly taxed at the
domicile of their owner, ' 20 and that it was there that the credits
passed under decedents' wills. 21 It might be said with respect to
the former of these reasons that there were also prior decisions of
the Court that permitted the transfer of credits to be taxed elsewhere than at their owner's domicile, one of which it expressly overruled, There was clearly nothing in the prior decisions sustaining
the domiciliary state's power to tax intangibles suggesting that the
recognition of its power was intended as a denial of a like power to
all other states. The second of these reasons states a legal conclusion which does not at all involve the further conclusion that the
credits did not simultaneously pass elsewhere unless it be assumed
either that there exists some general principle of law restricting the
passing of property at death to a single legal transfer or that some
constitutional provision imposes such limitation. There is, of course,
but one economic interest that passes from the former owner to
whosoever succeeds to it, but the issue here is not one of mere fact
but of what legal construction the law has imposed on such fact.
There is no greater inherent legal objection to having two legal transfers imposed on one factual transfer than there is to multiplying
taxable legal interests by imposing more than one legal interest on
the same ultimate economic interest. It is clear, therefore, that this
second reason is valid only if the conclusion it is intended to support
is assumed as correct. But, whatever be the dialectic weaknesses in
the reasoning supporting the preference for the domiciliary state,
states will be well advised to shalie their tax policies in the light of
its existence. The Court has thus far avoided committing itself on
the status of credits having a business situs in a non-domiciliary state.
This matter will be hereinafter more fully considered.
The decisions thus far have merely determined that a state cannot
impose an inheritance tax on the succession to bonds, registered 22 or
" Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98,
74 L. ed. 371 (1930).
' Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L. ed. 1056 (1930).
"For state cases involving inheritance taxes on registered state bonds of
the taxing state when owned by non-resident decedents, see Bliss v. Bliss, 221
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otherwise, notes, bank deposits, and credits evidenced by open accounts, merely on the basis that the debtor is dohniciled within it;
that it cannot impose such tax merely because the bonds or notes
"happen to be found" within it when their owner dies; and that it
cannot impose such tax even when the notes thus found within it are
secured by mortgages on local realty. The rule of Blackstone v.
Miller was expressly overruled. Whether Wheeler v. Sohmer,23 can
still be considered good law depends upon several things. Even if
it be assumed that but one state is to be permitted to tax the transfer
of notes and bonds, still it is not absolutely certain that the domiciliary
state will be the one accorded that power under the circumstances involved in that case. It is clear that that state will be selected unless
another state has an exceedingly strong claim for a preferred position. The Court treated the notes and bonds in the Baldwin Case as
happening to be found in Missouri when their Illinois owner died.
It is fairly arguable that that phrase does not cover the situation in
which their owner has placed notes and bonds in another state for
permanent safe-keeping where they remain for that purpose until
the date of his death. There would seem to be nothing oppressive or
arbitrary in permitting that state, in which in many cases ancillary
administration will be had with respect to those assets, to impose the
tax. The Court has on more than one occasion stated that fictions
-will not be allowed to obscure the facts. If that be taken as the point
of departure, the claim of the state in which the securities were kept
would seem to be superior to that of the domiciliary state whose claim
rests on the fiction of nobilia personam sequuntur, unless it be
held that the latter state derives a superior claim from the fact that
in most cases it carries the heavier burden connected with the administration of the estate. There is the further consideration that to permit
the non-domiciliary state alone to tax in this situation might encourage
evasion of taxes in the domiciliary state through a judicious distribution of securities for safekeeping in neighboring states. Whether
this situation is within the faintly suggested reservation of Mr. Justice
McReynolds in the Baldwin Case cannot be definitely determined.2 4
Mass. 201, 109 N. E. 148 (1915) (holding transfer taxable); Tax Comm. v.
Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 119 Oh. St. 410, 164 N. E. 423 (1929) (holding
transfer non-taxable). Both cases considered the problem from point of view
of statutory construction only, but some of the reasoning in the Massachusetts
case indicates that the court would have sustained the tax against due process
objections.
"' 233 U. S. 434, 34 Sup. Ct. 607, 58 L. ed. 1030 (1914).
'The language referred to is the following:
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Approached from the point of view adopted by Mr. Justice Stone,
this situation affords a very good instance of a single economic interest bearing such legal relationships to two states as to permit its
transfer to be taxed in both, but it is unlikely that this view will
prevail against the strong trend adverse to multi-state taxation. The
probability, however, is rather great that the doctrine of Wheeler v.
Sohmer can be deemed discarded, but another decision alone can remove a lingering doubt. The reason for this view is that it seems
highly unlikely in fact that the securities involved in the Baldwin
Case merely chanced to be in Missouri when their owner died; it
seems more reasonable (business situs for them having been excluded
by the Court's view of the case) to assume that their owner had entrusted them to his Missouri agent for safekeeping.
The present status of inheritance taxes on credits having a business situs in a non-domiciliary state is quite uncertain. The Court
explicitly stated in FarmersLoan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota that the
record presented no occasion for considering whether securities taxable by a state under the business situs doctrine could be taxed a
second time at their owner's domicile. It has not yet resolved this
issue since it found that the credits involved in both the Baldwin and
Beidler Cases did not have a business situs in the taxing state, although Mr. Justice Stone expressed the opinion that the credits in
the Baldwin Case might well have been found to have had a business
situs in Missouri. The language employed by the Court in entering
its caveat as to credits having a business situs rather suggests that
the state in which they have such situs will be preferred to the domiciliary state if it is eventually decided to prohibit their multi-state
taxation. This would seem to be a valid recognition of that state's
superior economic claim to treat those credits as a part of the assets
employed in a local business by their owner. There is but little likelihood that this will promote extensive tax evasions. The question
arises whether the same considerations would not be equally applicable to a partner's interest in a partnership's business and assets,
so that a deceased partner's interest therein should be localized where
the buiness is conducted and the assets are employed. That is the
economic fact, however much the legal issues may be complicated by
"Normally, as in the present instance, the state of the domicile enforces
its own tax and we need not now consider the possibility of establishing a
situs in another state by one who should undertake to arrange for succession
there and thus defeat the collection of the death, duties prescribed at his
domicile."
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questions as to the legal nature of a partner's interest in its business
and assets. It has, however, been held that where, under the partnership agreement and under the laws of the state in which the partnership's assets and business were located, the partner's interest is a right
to receive his share of the partnership's net value,25 the partner's
share is an intangible having a situs for tax purposes at his domicile.
Hence that state has a constitutional power to tax the transfer of a
resident's interest in a foreign partnership.2 6 It will be rather difficult to consider oppressive and arbitrary an inheritance tax imposed
on a non-resident decedent's share in a partnership imposed by the
state in which the partnership business and assets are located. Injustice can be avoided in the case of a partnership with assets and business in more than one state by permitting each to tax on that portion
of the value of the interest attributable to the assets and business
within it. There are cases in which a state -has been allowed to tax
the transfer of a non-resident partner's share in the partnership
capital. 27 This state's power to impose the tax should not be made
to turn on legal refinements as to nature of a partner's interest in the
partnership assets or business, which conceptions have been developed in connection with quite different problems. The natural desire
to employ a single conception in dealing with diverse problems in
order to secure a greater consistency in the whole body of the law
affords but a slender basis for denying effect to the obvious economic
fact that the partner's interest is as closely associated with the states
in which the partnership carries on its business as are credits having
a business situs with the state in which they have such a situs. If
the Court translates its intimation that the state of the business situs
of credits will be preferred to that of decedent's domicile into actual
decision, it will be hard for it to deny that the state in which a partnership has its business and assets should also be allowed to tax fhe
transfer of the share of a non-resident partner. This may involve
considerable difficulties and great inconvenience in the case of part' This theory is in accord with that adopted by the Uniform Partnership
Act.

, Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 49 Sup. Ct. 410, 72 L ed 749 (1928).
See also Arbuckle's Estate, 252 Pa. St. 161, 97 Atl. 186 (19f6) in which the
state in which the partnership business and assets were located was held not to
have taxed the transfer of a non-resident partner's interest; the constitutional
issue is not considered.
'See In re Henry, 203 App. Div. 456, 197 N. Y. S. 63 (1922), modified on
another point, 237 N. Y. 204, 142 N. E. 586 (1923) ; Smalls Estate, 151 Pa. St
1, 25 Atl. 23 (1892).
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nerships operating in several states, which could be avoided by localizing the transfer of such share at decedent partner's domicile.
Whether the Court will give such effect to these considerations cannot be safely predicted. If it should be held that the state in which
the partnership business and assets are located may tax, then multistate taxation will result unless Blodgett v. Silbeirwan follows Blackstone v. Miller. Furthermore it cannot be definitely determined
whether this situation, or the case of credits with a business situs
outside the domiciliary state, constitute instances in which a single
economic interest has such legal relationships to both the non-domiciliary and domiciliary states as to justify taxation by both, but both
are probably within that principle. It is patent, in any event, that
here is another uncertainty attributable to these recent decisions.
The prevailing opinion in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Mimicsore refers to the large proportion of our national wealth represented
by intangible personalty, and the desirability of protecting it against
discriminatory and oppressive taxation. Corporate shares comprise
a considerable part of such intangible wealth that would seem to
merit protection no less than capital investments represented by debtors' obligations in their various forms. The ultimate economic interest evidenced by a corporate share derives its value from the business
and assets of the corporation, and, therefore, bears a closer economic relation to the states in which the assets are situated and the
business conducted than it bears to other states whose claims rest
solely on the factors of corporate domicile or the share owner's
domicile. It may be inferred from the decision that due process
prevents a state from imposing an inheritance tax on the succession
to corporate shares, even at a value proportionate to the assets within
the taxing state, merely on the basis of the presence of corporate
assets or business within it, that the economic factor is not the principal legal determinant.2 8 The legal theory that the property interest
represented by the share is a distinct legal interest, including no direct
legal relation of the shareholder to the corporate assets and having a
situs unrelated to that of such assets, prevailed over economic facts.
There have been no decisions by the Federal Supreme Court directly
passing on the power of the state in which the stock certificates are
kept for safekeeping to impose an inheritance tax on their transfer
Tyler v. Dane County, 289 Fed. 843 (D. C. Wis. 1923), appeal dismissed,
266 U. S. 637, 45 Sup. Ct. 10, 69 L. ed. 481 (1924) ; Shepherd v. State, 184 Wis.
88, 197 N. W. 344 (1924); Rhode Island Hospital & Trust Co. v. Doughton,
270 U. S. 69, 46 Sup. Ct. 256, 70 L. ed. 475, 48 A. L. R. 1374 (1926).
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on that sole basis, but the decision in the Baldwiin Case clearly implies
that such tax cannot be imposed merely because such certificates
happen to be found within a state at the time of their non-resident
owner's death. An attempt by a state to impose such tax on the sole
basis that the stock was transferred on the corporate books at a
transfer office maintained in the state by a foreign corporation would
almost certainly be held to violate due process, but the Court has not
yet passed oft that point. There are, however, decisions of the Court
sustaining the power to impose inheritance taxes on the transfer of
corporate shares by both the state of the corporate and of the decedent owner's domicile. 29 It is fairly certain that the multi-state
inheritance taxation of this form of intangible wealth will be held
violative of due process unless adequate reasons can be found for
distinguishing capital investments evidenced by corporate shares from
such investments evidenced by debtors' obligations. There is no
economic basis for any such distinction. The legal theory on which
the state of the corporate domicile has been permitted to tax the
transfer is that the shares have a situs within it since they represent
a distributive share in the capital stock which itself has its situs
within that state, and that that state has the ultimate control over the
transfer of such shares. The fiction of owbilia sequuntur personam
has supplied the legal basis for permitting the state of decedent's
domicile to tax the transfer of corporate shares. These reasons are
certainly no more substantial than those formerly relied on to sustain
the power of several states to impose inheritance taxes on the transfer of credits. Unless, therefore, reasons of policy can be found for
distinguishing the cases, the multi-state inheritance taxation of corporate shares will soon be a thing of the past. There is no doubt
but that the case of such shares comes within the theory of Mr. Justice Stone that would permit multi-state taxation in this instance,
but nothing as yet warrants a belief that his theory has gained acceptance among those whose views will decide the issue. If, however, multi-state inheritance taxation of corporate shares is to be
prohibited, the question of which state shall be granted the power
becomes important. The decision will lie between the state of the
corporate and that of decedent's domicile. The decision in Frick v.
Pennsylvania, limiting the latter state to taxing on a value arrived at
' Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473, 60 L. ed. 830 (1916) ;
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69 L. ed. 1058, 42 A. L.

R. 316 (1925).
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by deducting from the value of the stock the inheritance tax paid
with respect to its transfer to the state of the corporate domicile,
clearly rests on the theory that the claims of the state of the corporate domicile are superior to those of the state of decedent's domicile.
The legal theory underlying this preference is one developed for
quite other problems than taxation, and the tax issue should not be
settled by reasoning from it as a premise. It contains elements of
fiction as does the theory employed to justify the state of decedent's
domicile to tax at all. The issue of which of these states should be
preferred should not be settled on such tenuous grounds. It cannot
be settled by invoking the theory that correlates jurisdiction with
protection since both states protect the legal interest represented by
the share in some respects and under some circumstances. The state
of decedent's domicile is that in which ordinarily the decedent's economic position will be most affected by his ownership of such shares
while he was alive. That state also will usually have protected his
person in a degree beyond that secured from the state of the corporate domicile. It would seem that these considerations, and the
greater convenience of localizing the share at his domicile, should
lead to a reversal of the preference for the state of the corporate
domicile implicit in the decision in Frick v. Pennsylvania. It must
be admitted that reliance upon the argument based on the protection
of the person of the decedent while living introduces a factor whose
logical consequences might conflict with those implicit in theories
elsewhere employed to justify restrictions on the domiciliary state's
power, but complete consistency of theory can scarcely be hoped for
in dealing with a complex series of problems whose solution involves
many and competing considerations. The claims of the decedent's
domiciliary state are strengthened by the consideration that it will
usually be that in which such assets are certain to be administered
whereas administration in the state of the corporate domicile will be
required only to satisfy its taxing statutes. The recent decisions
have injected an element of uncertainty into the law of the inheritance taxation of corporate shares, and made changes in it very
probable.
That a state cannot impose an inheritance tax on the transfer of
notes of resident debtors actually administered through its courts
even when the notes are secured by mortgages on lands situated
within it is clear from the decision in the Baldwin Case. It follows
that a state would be prohibited from imposing such tax on the
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transfer of such notes if the only basis on which it could rest the
power was that they were secured by mortgages or liens on local assets. There have been cases in which the fact that credits owned by
non-residents were secured by mortgages on local real estate constituted a principal reason for holding their transfer taxable.30 The
theory was largely that that fact gave the credit a situs within the
taxable state because of control over the enforcement of the claim,
rather than that the tax was on the succession to the mortgage interest in the land which would pass with the transfer of the credit,
although that view seems at least to be suggested. These cases can
no longer be regarded as law so far as they allowed the transfer of
the credit to be taxed.3 1 The prevailing opinion in Baldwin v. Missouri, however, explicitly stated that that case did "not involve the
right of a state to tax either the interest which a mortgagee as such
may have in lands lying therein, or the transfer of that interest."
Does this reservation of that issue from the scope of the decision
mean anything more than that that question is still open? Can it be
construed as implying a doubt as to the power of a state to tax the
succession to such interest even though it cannot tax the claim secured by the mortgage? To resolve that doubt in favor of the power
to tax will greatly limit the benefits sought to be achieved by the
recent decisions unless the power of the decedent's domicile is concurrently and correspondingly curtailed. That is quite improbable
since the theory on which the state in which the mortgaged property
is situated wil be allowed to tax, if it is allowed to do so, will involve
no conflict with the principle localizing the credit at the decedent's
domicile. The result will be that the latter will be permitted to tax
the transfer of the credit while the former will be empowered to tax
the concurrent transfer of the creditor's security interest. The char32
acter of that security interest might be either legal or equitable,
but this should not affect the power to impose the tax of the state in
which that interest may be said to have its situs. If the credit is
secured by mortgage on property in more than one state, the argument would run in favor of all of them, at least so far as to permit
Kinney v. Stevens, 207 Mass. 368, 93 N. E. 586 (1911) ; Auditor General
v. Merriam's Estate, 147 Mich. 630, 111 N. W. 196 (1907).
"The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed a former holding to the contrary
shortly after the decision in Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, even
where the debtor was domiciled within it. See In re Smith's Estate, 228 N. W.
638 (Iowa 1930).
'For an instance of the latter see Kinney v. Stevens, 207 Mass. 368, 93

N. E. 586 (1911).
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each to tax the transfer on the basis of an allocated value and, perhaps, on a value equal to the whole value of the credit up to the value
of the security within the state. The bondholder whose bonds are
secured by a deed of trust has an equitable interest in the security,
and under this theory the succession to his interest could be taxed
wherever the property covered by the trust deed had its situs. This
might be partly avoided by localizing the equitable interest at the
trustee's domicile. The friction and annoyance incident to such a
system make those against which FarmersLoan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota was aimed seem insignificant. It is quite true that the system
would not involve multi-state taxation of the same legal interest, but
it is unlikely that this would deter the court from invoking due process to prevent it. It is, therefore, improbable that the statement of
the plain fact that Baldwin v. Missouri did not involve a particular
question will ever be held an adequate basis for concluding that a
state will be permitted to tax the succession to the security interest
when it cannot tax the transfer of the secured credit.
There are several other decisions involving situations, on which
the Federal Supreme Court itself has not yet passed, whose status is
doubtful since it decided the recent cases. The first of these involves
the question of what states can impose inheritance taxes on the succession to a decedent's beneficial interest in property held in trust.
The state of his domicile can constitutionally impose property taxes
on that interest,3 3 and that state has been allowed to impose an inheritance tax on its transfer.3 4 On the other hand the state of principal administration of the trust,3 5 and the state in which the trust
realty had its situs,3 have taxed the succession to a non-resident
decedent's beneficial interest. None of these cases specifically discussed a constitutional question, but their arguments do purport to
deal with the jurisdictional problem. There are also the situations
in which an inheritance tax has been imposed on a resident vendor's
interest in a land contract relating to realty in another state,8 7 and on
a non-resident vendor's interest under a land contract relating to
realty within the taxing state.3 8 Neither of these cases explicitly
' Hunt v. Perry, 165 Mass. 287, 43 N. E. 103 (1896).
",Dana v. Treas & Rec. General, 227 Mass. 562, 116 N. E. 941 (1917).
'Thorne v. State, 145 Minn. 412, 177 N. W. 638 (1920).
'Baker v. Comm'r of Corp. & Taxation, 253 Mass. 130, 148 N. E. 593
(1925).

1 State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 155, 176 N. W. 493

(1920).
'In re Roger's Estate, 149 Mich. 305, 112 N. W. 931 (1907).
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considered the constitutional point. If the state of vendor's domicile
can validly treat his interest as personalty, while that in which the
lands are situated can still treat the land as legally his, the result is
multi-state taxation of a kind no less burdensome than the taxation
of the same legal interest by more than a single state. These problems have not yet been authoritatively settled, but the recent decisions
suggest more than a possibility that the attempts of different states
to impose inheritance taxes on various and inconsistent theories will
be further limited as soon as the Federal Supreme Court has occasion to pass on them. It is further certain that the court will not
countenance the practise of some states to invoke the fiction of
equitable conversion to extend their powers to impose inheritance
taxes on the succession to foreign realty of decedents dying domiciled within them.39
The formal factor on which a state's power to impose property or
inheritance taxes depends is that the property have its situs within it.
It must be apparent from what has already been said that the decision
that an intangible has a situs within a certain state is not the affirmation of a fact but the formulation of a legal conclusion,4 o and that
considerations of reasonable policy are important in reaching that
conclusion. The preceding discussion has been wholly concerned with
the effect of the recent decisions on the law as to a state's power to
impose inheritance taxes, which alone were involved in those cases. The
questions arise whether the law as to a state's power to impose property taxes on intangible personalty is likely to remain unaffected, and
what, if any, changes are likely to occur. That some changes are
likely can fairly be deduced from the fact that the evils aimed at by
the recent decisions are at least as great from an annually recurring
tax as from an inheritance tax. The attempt of the debtor's state to
tax the bondholder's property interest was early frustrated by the
Supreme Court 41 even when the bonds were secured by mortgage
See Land Title & Trust Co. v. Tax Comm., 131 S. C. 192, 126 S. E. 189

(1924), which collects authorities both sustaining and refusing to apply this
theory.
h' This is equally true of a judgment that a tangible has a certain situs. It
is only the fact that the physical location of a tangible is generally, but not
always, the decisive factor in determining its situs that has tended to obscure
the truth that the judgment as to the situs of tangibles is a legal construction

of fact, not a mere factual judgment.

"State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300, 21 L. ed. 179
(1873). This case has been cited more frequently than its merits warrant,
especially since the jurisdictional problem has become a matter of the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It may still have
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on realty within the taxing state. 42 The power of the creditor's state
to tax them was early sustained against the contention, among others,
that the tax violated the due process clause. 48 The tax was upheld
on the theory that the situs of the credit was at its owner's domicile,
and that this was not affected by the fact that it was secured by a
mortgage on realty in another state. An attempt to deduce from the
theory that a bond is something more than a mere evidence of the
debt the conclusion that it, and the mortgage securing it, were tangibles or sufficiently of that nature so as to be within the principles
governing the taxation of tangibles, has been rejected, even when the
bond was that of a non-resident debtor secured by a mortgage on
non-local realty and both had always been kept for safekeeping in a
state other than that of the owner's domicile. 44 The theory that due
process prevents a state from taxing credits on the sole basis of the
presence within it of the instruments evidencing the credit, announced
in Buck v. Beach," is not likely to be abandoned, and bonds will
certainly be held within it if a case should ever arise. Bonds were
already protected against multi-state property taxes under earlier
decisions, and the recent cases merely give additional support to that
position. This conclusion applies equally to credits evidenced by
notes or mere open accounts. Neither conclusion applies where the
bonds, notes or accounts have acquired a business situs in a state
other than that of their owner's domicile.
It has been frequently decided that a state other than that of the
owner's domicile can tax credits, whether or not evidenced by notes,
if those credits have acquired what is described as a business situs
46
within it.
It is not within the purview of this discussion to consider what facts will warrant the legal inference that credits have a
business situs within a given state.47 It is of importance that it has
been stated that the jurisdiction of the state of the owner's domicile
to impose property taxes on such credits does not exclude the power
value if it be assumed that it embodies an interpretation of fundamental jurisdictional principles in the light of which due process is to be construed.
' North Cent. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 262, 19 L. ed. 88 (1866).

"Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 25 L. ed. 558 (1879).
" Lockwood v. Blodgett, 106 Conn. 525, 138 Atl. 520 (1927).
' 206 U. S.392, 27 Sup. Ct. 712, 51 L. ed. 1106 (1907).
'Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct. 585, 44 L. ed.
701 (1900) ; New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 110, 44 L. ed.
174 (1899); Met. Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, 27 Sup. Ct.
499, 51 L. ed. 853 (1907) ; London & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Assessors, 221
U. S.346, 31 Sup. Ct. 550, 55 L. ed. 762 (1911).
4 See Powell, The Business Situs of Credits (1922)

28 W. VA. L.

Q.89.
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of the state of their business situs to impose like taxes thereon.4 8
The question is whether the recent decisions imply a negative upon
the continuation of the multi-state taxation of such credits. Their
treatment for inheritance tax purposes is still an open question, and
the same must be said as to their treatment for purposes of property
taxes. The considerations heretofore adduced when discussing the
probable decision as to their liability to inheritance taxes are relevant
in discussing their position for property tax purposes. If the prohibition on multi-state taxation of a person's legal interest in a single
economic interest is to be carried to its logical conclusions, the existing law as to imposing property taxes on credits having a business
situs in a non-domiciliary state will have to be changed. There is no
sound economic basis for distinguishing capital invested in a state
represented by credits having a business situs within it from direct
investments of capital in seats on exchanges of various kinds. It has
been decided that a state does not deny its residents due process by
imposing property taxes on seats on exchanges located without the
state, 49 and that the state in which the exchange is located can tax
non-residents on their seats on such exchange without violating due
process.50 These decisions thus expose the legal interest in a single
economic interest to multi-state taxation. It is difficult to see how
both these decisions can stand in the light of the recent cases unless
either the theory of Mr. Justice Stone be applied, some other theory
heretofore invoked to sustain these taxes be reaffirmed, a new theory
be developed, or the position be adopted limiting the scope of the
recent decisions to inheritance taxes. If the multi-state property
taxation of exchange seats is to be prohibited, the theory urged by
Mr. Justice Holmes in Citizens National Bank v. Durr that the location of the object of the right is a factor in the jurisdictional problem might well be employed to limit taxation to the state in which
the exchange is located. The considerations applicable to the problem of exchange seats are equally applicable to the capital interest
represented by a partner's share in the partnership business and
assets. Existing decisions also permit property taxes to be imposed
on corporate shares by both the state of the corporate domicile and
"' London & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct.
550, 55 L. ed. 762 (1911).
Citizens Nat. Bk. v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99, 42 Sup. Ct. 15, 66 L. ed. 149
(1921).
Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U. S. 184, 36 Sup. Ct. 265, 60 L. ed. 594
(1916).
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that of their owner's domicile. 5 ' How far these decisions still stand
must now be deemed an unsettled question. The same must be said
of such taxation of property held in trust and of the beneficial interest therein. It has been decided that a state cannot impose a property
tax on the trust res, even when this consists of intangibles, merely
because the cestui is domiciled within it,52 or because of that factor
and the fact that it was established by a resident settlor.53 It is quite
probable from the importance played by the desire to avoid double
taxation in the argument of the prevailing opinion in the case last
cited that multi-state property taxation of intangibles held in trust
will not be permitted. The same case, however, intimates that the
principle against multi-state taxation, as conceived by the Court, will
not prevent the taxation of the trust res by one state and the taxation
of the cestui's equitable interest by another,5 4 but that it will permit
more than one state to tax such interest is quite improbable, but still
undecided. Further questions that remain open are the taxation of
a resident vendor's interest under a land contract pertaining to foreign realty and the taxation of the same vendor on his interest in
such land by the state in which the land is situated. It is unlikely
that the recent decisions will have any effect upon a state's power to
impose property taxes on the security interest'of a non-resident in
local realty.
The conduct of a business employing tangibles frequently produces an intangible variously described as good-will, franchise value,
or corporate excess. The state of the corporate domicile has been
allowed'to tax the whole of this intangible even where all the income
producing tangibles and business were outside it, and this was held
not to violate due process.5 5 It has also been decided in a long line
of cases that other states in which the business is conducted can with" Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466, 25 Sup. Ct. 297, 49 L. ed. 556 (1905) ;
Hawley v. Malden, 232 U. S. 1, 34 Sup. Ct. 201, 58 L. ed. 477 (1914); Bellows
Falls Power Co. v. Comm., 222 Mass. 51, 109 N. E. 891 (1915).
'Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U. S. 27, 48 Sup. Ct. 422, 72 L. dd. 767 (1928).
"Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59, 74
L. ed. 180 (1929).
" The taxation of the cestwi's interest by the state of his domicile on that
basis alone has been held not to be unconstitutional, Hunt v. Perry, 165 Mass.
287, 43 N. E. 103 (1896). See for similar holding where there were other
possible bases on which to support the tax, City of St. Albans v. Avery, 95 Vt.
249, 114 AtI. 31 (1921); cert. denied, 257 U. S. 640, 42 Sup. Ct. 51, 66 L. ed.
411 (1921) ; Writ of Error dismissed, 257 U. S. 666, 42 Sup. Ct. 54, 66 L. ed
425 (1921).
'Cream of Wikeat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U. S. 325, 40 Sup.
Ct. 558, 64 L. ed. 931 (1920).
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out violating due process tax a part of that intangible property by
the employment of the""unit rule" theory. 56 The particular principles defining the constitutional limits on a non-domiciliary state's
power to determine the amount of such intangible allocable to it lie
outside the scope of the present discussion. The fact of present significance is that, as long as all these decisions stand, this intangible
will be subject to taxation on its full value in the domiciliary state
and to further taxation in other states on that portion of its value
allocabld to them. This will be true even if the rules adopted by all
the states involved for determining its value produce the same value,
and those employed by the non-domiciliary states for allocating values
to them result in no duplication of values. There is no doubt but
that the logical consequences of the theory that due process prohibits
multi-state taxation of an owner's legal interest in a single economic
interest involve the scrapping of the existing system for taxing this
intangible. It was because of this very fadt that the dissenting
opinions in the early cases involving this system argued for localizing that intangible at the owner's domicile. 57 The law -has, therefore, been developed in the face of contentions that it would produce
double taxation, but this fact loses practically all its importance because judicial hostility tQwards the-double taxation of intangibles
developed thereafter. If this movement is extended to this type of
intangible, there will arise the very troublesome problem of which
state shall be permitted to tax. The taxpayer's convenience would be
best served by localizing it at the corporate domicile. That would,
however, involve ignoring the economic claims of the states in which
are located the property and business to which this intangible owes
its existence. The result'reached in Cream of Wheat Co. v, Grand
Forks has but little to recommend it from the point of view of the
economic considerations just referred to. To exclude the power of
other states having a superior economic claim to tax this wealth
merely t6 prefer that of a state having no other claim than that the
corporafion was chartered by it seems economically unsound, even
c' Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 11 Sup. Ct. 876,

35 L. ed. 613 (1891); Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio, 166 U. S. 185, 17 Sup. Ct. 604,
41 L. ed. 965 (1897); Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171, 17 Sup. Ct.
527, 41 L. ed. 960 (1877); Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490, 24 Sup. Ct. '498, 48
L. ed. 761 (1904); Southern Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 274 U. S. 76, 47 Sup. Ct.
542, 71 L. ed. 934 (1927). See Isaacs, The Unit Rule (1926) 35 YAn L. 5.

838.

' See Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305, 41 L. ed.

683 (1897).
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after allowing for the consideration that the state may have been
selected as that in which to incorporate in order to secure valuable
economic advantages. If it should be decided to prohibit this type
of multi-state taxation, it may prove necessary to prevent evasions by
correspondingly limiting the power of the states in selecting measures for excise taxes on. the privilege of existing as a corporation or
engaging within them in business in corporate form. It is practically
certain that the Court will not derive from the premise that due
process prohibits multi-state taxation the conclusion that the methods for determining the value and the allocation formulas of the
various states that may be permitted to tax a part of this intangible
wealth must be so related that no duplication of values occurs. The
only practicable method for insuring that result would be to have the
identical methods and formulas in all the states, and to use only factors objectively determinable so as to avoid possible duplication of
values resulting in the course of administering the laws. This would
require judicial action that is not likely to be deduced from the due
process clause. It is, therefore, fairly arguable that the existing law
on this problem shares to some extent in the uncertainty which the
recent decisions have introduced into the problem of the limits imposed on a state's taxing power by the due process clause.
The preceding discussion has aimed primarily to indicate the extent to which the recent decisions have disturbed the system of rules
and principles governing a state's jurisdiction to tax that had been
constructed over a long period of years. That law had been developed in part by applying to tax problems technical theories and
premises that had been evolved for other purposes, and in part by invoking considerations of policy definitely related to the tax problem.
A clear instance of the former type is that which supports the power
of the state of the corporate domicile to tax the shares owned by
non-residents because the share represents an interest in the capital
stock which has its situs in that state. Factors of policy are present
in the theories that correlate the power to tax with the power to protect the thing taxed or the person of its owner, and in the arguments
supporting the power of a given state to tax intangibles because they
might otherwise wholly escape taxation. Mr. Justice Stone supports
his opposition to the decision in Baldwin v. Missouri by the argument
that it will tend to facilitate tax evasion. The principal factor in the
recent decisions was the desire to prevent what were conceived to be
the injustices and other bad consequences of the multi-state taxation
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of intangibles, an argument whose validity cannot be even discussed
without bringing in questions of what constitute sound tax policies.
The dissenting views of Mr. Justice Holmes in the recent cases acquire a large measure of their force from their emphasis on the
necessity of permitting states considerable leeway in raising their
revenues. The recent cases do not differ from many that preceded
them in invoking considerations of policy as factors in their decision.
They differ only in the relative importance attached to factors of
policy as compared with other factors, and in giving what appears to
be decisive importance in dealing with the taxation of intangibles to
a policy whose relevance in that connection had theretofore been
denied. The economic effects of a state's tax policy upon the maintenance of a free capital market within the whole of the United States
has thus become a crucial element in determining the validity of its
fiscal program under the due process clause. There is no reason why
this should not be considered if other factors of policy are to be taken
into account, and experience has shown that it is practically impossible to exclude them in applying the test of reasonableness that determines the validity of state action when due process is invoked to
,defeat it. It would seem to be much more pertinent to that issue
than some of the technical legal arguments employed in dealing with
this jurisdictional problem. It would, however, be a mistake to treat
it as always the decisive factor. The solution must take account of
the necessity for giving states leeway in framing their tax policies
not merely in order that they may secure adequate revenues but also
in order that their powers to distribute the burden fairly be not too
severely limited by subtracting from their power elements entering
into the wealth of their residents. Even here it seems desirable to
substitute for technical legal theories factors of economic significance.
It may prove practically undesirable to localize the taxation of wealth
or its transfer in those states in which the economic factors are present that give that wealth its value, and it may also be practically impossible to determine where it shall be localized on that theory. There
is, however, no reason for ignoring this factor in determining the
reasonableness of a state's taxing policy and thereby its validity.
The recent decisions have the merit of frankly injecting economic
considerations into the solution of these constitutional problems. They
have opened the way to a reExamination of our former solutions to
some of them on the basis of more fundamental considerations than
some that have in the past been employed in reaching those solutions.
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A period of uncertainty as to how much of the former law on these'
jurisdictional problems remains unimpaired may ultimately prove a
price worth paying for this opportunity to reexamine, and perhaps,
redefine, the premises for our thinking about these problems.5 8
For discussions of the general problem and related problems, see Beale,
Jurisdiction to Tax (1919) 32 HARv. L. Rzv. 587; Carpenter, Jurisdiction overDebts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment and Taxation (1918)
31 HARv. L. REnv. 905; Maxey, Situa of PersonalPropertyfor Purposesof Tax-.
ation (1919) 3 MINN. L. REV 217; Nossaman, The Fourteenth Amendment in
its Relation to State Taxation (1930) 18 CALIF. L. Rav. 345; Chambers, State
Inheritance Tax on Foreign-heldBonds or Notes Secured by Mortgage on Land"
in State (1927) 12 CoRN. L. Q. 172; Mason, Juritdiction for the Purpose of'
Imposing Inheritance Taxes (1931) 29 MicH. L. REv. 324; C. L. B. Lowndes,

Tendencies in the Taxation of Intangibles (1930) 17 VA. L. Rav. 146; Peppin,

The Power of the State to Tax Intangiblesor Their Transfer (1930) 18 CALIF..
L. REv.638.

